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Admissions "Against Interest" in Ohio
It has long been a requirement for the admissibility of the
statements of a witness submitted to a court for purposes of prov-
ing the truth of the matter asserted therein that they be based on
his own knowledge of events. This is the rule against the admission
of hearsay evidence. In general, the reasons advanced for this rule
are that hearsay testimony is really that of a person not on the
witness stand and thus not under oath, not available for cross-
examination, not confronted by the person against whom he is testi-
fying, and unavailable for observation by the jury as to his de-
meanor. The rule, however, has been limited by many exceptions.'
Generally, the exceptions provide that extra-judicial statements
may not be related in court unless adequate reason for the una-
vailability of the declarant as a witness exists and the statement
itself is attended by some circumstantial guaranty of trustworthi-
ness.2 But one well-established rule of evidence dictates that out-
of-court statements of a party to an action may be introduced as
evidence against him.3
THEORIES OF ADmISSioN
As to the basis in reason of this rule and thus as to its scope
and effect, the authorities are in conflict.4 Professor Greenleaf in-
dicates that the party-declarant by making the statement has
waived not only any objection he might have to its admissibility as
evidence, but also the necessity of proof of the fact asserted.5 He
states as follows:
"Such evidence seems, therefore, more properly admissi-
ble as a substitute for the ordinary and legal proof, either
in virtue of the direct consent and waiver of the party, as
in the case of explicit and solemn admissions; or on
grounds of public policy and convenience, as in the case
of those implied from assumed character, asquiescence or
conduct."
This theory of the waiver of the requirement of proof of the fact
admitted has not been applied by the courts. Rather, the declara-
15 WiG omE, EvIDENcE §136f ff. (3d ed. 1940); 3 JoNES, ComNTARIEs ON
EVIDENCE §1075 (2d ecL 1926).
2 5 id. §1420 ff.
3 4 WiGnioR, EVIDENCE §§1048, 1049 (3d ed. 1940); 2 JoNsS, COMMENTARIES
ON EVIDENCE §893 ff. (2d ed. 1926); 1 GREENLEAP, EviENcE §169 (13th ed. 1876).
4 See Morgan, Admission as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 Yale L.
Journal, 355 (1921).
51 GREE=AF, supra, note 3.
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tion is usually treated merely as evidence of the fact asserted.6
The author does not point to any circumstance of trustworthiness
justifying such use of an admission. Nor does he indicate a theory
of admissibility in the event that the statement is treated merely
as competent evidence. Another view is that admissions are re-
ceived merely to impeach the claim of the opponent in the action,7
but not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement,
thus avoiding any heresay problem. This theory was advanced by
Dean Wigmore in one of his earlier editions.8 However, the cotirts
also have failed to apply this reasoningY Further, the courts have
consistently refused to require the laying of a foundation for the
introduction of admissions.10
A third theory submits that the out of court declarations are
not received to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein, but
as circumstantial evidence to show the state of mind of the party
at a different time. Once the former belief of the declarant is estab-
lished the facts which must have led to that belief are inferred.
These facts, of course, are substantially the ones asserted in the
declarant's statement. By this process, the prohibition of the hear-
say rule has been avoided, but the same result is reached as if an
exception had been created to it." Unlike the earlier two views,
this theory reaches results consistent with those of the judicial
decisions. However, none of the three have been consistently ap-
plied by the courts. Thus it would seem that out of court declara-
tions by a party to a suit are admissible as evidence of the truth
of the matter asserted therein, and not as a judicial admnission of a
6 4 WiGmOR, supra, note 3, §1048.
7 This is to be distinguished from the discrediting of a witness by his own
prior contradictory statements.
81 WiGom, EvInNcE §1048 (lst ed. 1904).
9 DeGroodt v. Skrbina, 111 Ohio St. 108, 144 N.E. 601, 603 (1924); Warder
v. Fisher, 48 Wis. 338, 4 N.W. 470 (1880) where the court stated: ".... When the
witness who has made the contradictory statements out of court is also a
party to the action, such unsworn statements are received, not only for the
purpose of attacking the credibility of the sworn statements of the party, but
for the purpose of establishing the truth of the unsworn contradictory state-
ments themselves"; McManus v. Nichols-Chisholm Lumber Co., 105 Minn.
144, 117 N.E. 223 (1908) where the court said: "All admissions by a party,
made outside the record, if relevant to the issue, are admissible in evidence,
and such evidence has a two-fold effect. It tends . . . to prove the fact
in issue to which the admissions relate, and where they contradict the testi-
mony of the party, the evidence tends to discredit him; or in other words, such
evidence is admissible to prove the fact admitted and to discredit the party."
1 DeGroodt v. Skrbina, note 9, supra; Conrad v. Kerby, 66 Ohio App. 359,
31 NYE.2d 168 (1940); McManus v. Nichols-Chisholm Lumber Co., note 9,
supra.
1 See Note 34 Harv. L. Rev. 205 (1920).
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fact or as impeaching evidence. These statements then would seem
to fall within the scope of the hearsay rule.
The majority of American jurisdictions have allowed the in-
troduction of admissions without the requirement of the customary
elements for the existence of the average exception to the hearsay
rule. Thus, it is not required that the declaration state facts con-
trary to the declarant's interest at the time of the statement1 2 , nor
that the utterance be spontaneous or excited. Why then are admis-
sions an acceptable form of testimony, especially with the declar-
ant usually available as a witness?
It would seem that the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthi-
ness and the element of unavailability of the declarant are not
needed in order to override any hearsay objections to the evidence,
because such objections do not seem to be present in the case of
admissions. Where B's statement of a few months ago is related
by a witness as evidence against B in an action, the objection of
want of cross-examination does not seem important. B knowing all
the facts surrounding the making of the declaration is in an ex-
cellent position to question the witness, and he may take the stand
himself to explain, deny, or qualify the related statement. This op-
portunity now afforded B also solves the problem of the jury ob-
serving his demeanor. Further, it seems clear that B should not
be heard to object to a lack of confrontation or that he was not
under oath when he made the statements. As the hearsay objec-
tions are absent, it seems valid to say that admissions of a party
to the suit are admissible because the hearsay rule is satisfied.'3
In reality, this reasoning would seem to be the basis of the admissi-
bility of admissions.
A SOURCE OF CONFUSION
The admissions of a party-opponent are to be distinguished
from the exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against in-
terest.1 4 This rule allows testimony as to the declarations of a de-
ceased or insane declarant who is not a party nor in privity with
a party to the suit. These declarations must have been character-
ized by features disserving to the declarant's interest which out-
124 WiGMoRE, supra, note 3, §1049; State v. Anderson, 10 Or. 448, 454
(1882);
"But the admissibility of a party's own previous statements or declara-
tions in respect to the subject in controversy, or evidence against him, does
not in any manner depend upon the question whether they were for or against
his interest at the time they were made, or afterwards. The opposite party
has a right to introduce then if relevant and voluntarily made. .. ."
13 This is substantially the position taken by Dean Wigrnore in his latest
work. See 4 WIGTirOR, supra, note 3, §1048.
14 4 id. §1049, 1455 ff.; 2 Jo=rs, supra, note 3, §1164 ff.
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weight those self-serving.'5 It is usually required that the declar-
ant have no probable motive to falsify and have competent or pe-
culiar knowledge of the facts involved.16 Obviously, this is a typical
exception to the hearsay rule based on attending circumstances of
reliability17 and a necessity created by the unavailability of the de-
clarant.'8
However, some courts have confused the two doctrines by stat-
ing that the admissions of a party-opponent are admissible because
they were against the party's interest when he made them.19 Extra-
judicial declarations of a party would seem to satisfy the main hear-
say objections as above explained regardless of their disserving or
self-serving nature.20 Where in response to a demand by A for the
payment of a debt of one hundred dollars B asserts the debt is only
fifty dollars, B has made a self-serving declaration. Yet in a later
action by A for the fifty dollars, B's statement is competent as an
admission. The self-serving feature should affect the credibility of
the evidence, as the statement would seem to be more reliable if
the declarant had been relating facts contrary to his pecuniary or
15 5 WIG oIR, supra, note 1, §1464 and cases cited.
16 Ibid. See also State v. Campbell, 21 Ohio Dec. 851, 11 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 673, aff'd. 86 Ohio St. 335, 99 N.E. 1133 (1911) where the court
quoted, and approved authority as follows: "'Verbal declarations are received
in evidence in an action between third parties, when accompanied by the
following prerequisites: 1. The declarant must be dead; 2. The declaration
must have been against the pecuniary interest of the declarant at the time
it was made; 3. The declaration must be of a fact in relation to a matter con-
cerning which the declarant was immediately and personally cognizable; and
4. The court should be satisfied that the declarant had no probable motive to
falsify the fact declared."'
175 id. §147; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence §148 (13th ed. 1876) where it is
stated: "The ground upon which this evidence is received, is the extreme im-
probability of its falsehood. The regard which men usually pay to their
own interest is deemed a sufficient security, both that the declarations were
not made under any mistake of fact, or want of information on the part of
the declarant, if he had the requisite means of knowledge, and that the
matter declared is true."
18 See Morgan, Declarations against Interest, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 451 (1952).
19 Baird's Estate, 193 Cal. 225, 223 Pac. 974 (1924) ; see discussion citing note
23, infra.
20 This is said to be the rule in all jurisdictions. 4 WiGImios, supra,
note 3, §1048 stating ". . . no Court ever yet excluded an opponent's ad-
mission because of such a limitation"; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 41 Atl.
820 (1898): "Admissions are not admitted as testimony of the declarant in re-
spect to any facts in issue; . . . They are admitted because conduct of a par-
ty to the proceeding, in respect to the matter in dispute, whether by acts,
speech, or writing, which is clearly inconsistent with the truth of his con-
tention, is a fact relevant to the issue."
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proprietary interest.21 But it is hard to see how the matter of in-
terest affects the existence of the aforementioned hearsay objec-
tions. In the case of the declarations against interest exception, the
disserving character of the statement aids in giving it sufficient
probative value to override any objectionable features, but the
traditional hearsay characteristics would seem to remain.
EARLY CoNFusIoN IN OHno
Certain early Ohio cases apparently failed to recognize the
existence of the doctrine of admissions and tried to place the state-
ments of a party-opponent within the framework of the exception
for declarations against interest.2 2 This is illustrated by Webster
v. Pau.23 There Paul sought recovery in an action in contract al-
leging that Webster and Hubbard were partners. Hubbard claiming
not to be jointly liable attempted to prove statements of Webster
as to the dissolution of the partnership. In holding the evidence in-
admissible, the court said:
"There is a rule which allows declarations against the in-
terest of the persons making them, and for that rule the
reason is given. 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 147. But that rule re-
quires the declarant to be deceased. Here he is living, is a
party to the record, and, as the law now stands, might
have been examined as a witness..."
This confusion is also illustrated by the court's citation of
Greenleaf's section on the declaration against interest exception.2 4
Yet the doctrine of admissions would clearly be applicable in this
case. In Thompson v. ThoMpson,25 the court said by dictum that the
basis for the competency of admissions is that they are against the
interest of the party when made. In support of this assertion, the
court again quoted Greenleaf's treatise.26 A later Ohio case, Rapp
v. Becker,2 7 involving an action to set aside a will, expressly held
that the out of court statements of a party were inadmissible. The
court said that the declarations were made during the lifetime of
the testator, and that they were not against the declarant's interest
as she could have had no interest under the will at that time.
214 WI mooR, supra, note 3, §1048: "However, any attempt to stress this
distinction tends to vain logical quibbles, and should not be made the basis
of any instruction on the weight of the evidence."
22 Richardson v. Hughes, Wright, 648 (1835); Webster v. Paul, 10 Ohio St.
531 (1860); also Samuel Wymond Cooperage Co. v. Thompson, 8 Ohio N.P. 347
(1900), aff'd 64 Ohio St. 589, 61 N.E. 1151 (1901).
23 10 Ohio St. 531, 536 (1860).
24 See note 17, supra.
2513 Ohio St. 356 (1862); see also Dunn v. Cronise, 9 Ohio 82 (1839).
26 See note 17, supra.
27 26 Ohio Cir. Ct. 321 (1904).
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LArm Omo 0 CASES
With these cases among the early Ohio precedents, later state-
ments by the courts concerning a party's admissions against inter-
est are perhaps more understandable.28 In Goz v. Tenney,29 the
plaintiff offered defendant's report to his insurance company, and
in passing upon its admissibility, the supreme court made the fol-
lowing statement:
"...any statement against interest is always compe-
tent to be shown; it matters not to whom the statement is
made. The statement... to an insurance company embody-
ing such declarations against interest is not an exception
to this rule..."
In DeGroodt v. Skrbina,30 the court spoke of certain admissible
evidence as an "admission against interest." In ruling upon the ad-
missibility of statements of a predecessor in interest, the court in
Latham v. Clark3' stated as follows:
".... where a declarant was in a position to have knowl-
edge of the facts, and such admission is against the interest
of the declarant, as where it may be construed to amount
to an acknowledgement of an indebtedness to some other
person..."
In Abbott v. Cocke,3 2 the court of appeals made the following state-
ment:
"The members of this court do not understand that in Ohio
there exists any degree of uncertainty concerning the ad-
missibility of a declaration against interest made by the
defendant..."
The extra-judicial statements involved in all of these cases were
to the pecuniary or proprietary disadvantage of the declarant at
the time made, and were admitted in evidence. Thus, none of these
cases constitutes a direct holding that a statement must be against
the maker's pecuniary or proprietary interest. Rather, these state-
ments are at most dicta to the effect that an attempt to introduce
an opponent's declaration which is self-serving in nature would
fail. Possibly, the use of the words, "against interest," in many of
these cases, is with reference to the problem of relevancy. For the
28 Goz v. Tenney, 104 Ohio St. 500, 136 N.E. 215 (1922); Smith v. The
Cleveland Ry. Co., 30 Ohio App. 21, 164 N.E. 59 (1928); DeGroodt v. Skrbina,
111 Ohio St. 108, 144 N.E. 601 (1924); McNaughton v. Presbyterian Church, 35
Ohio App. 443, 172 N.E. 561 (1930); Latham v. Clark, 120 Ohio St. 559, 146
N.E. 685 (1925); Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v. McMahen, 31 Ohio App. 365, 165
N.E. 695 (1929); Abbott v. Cocke, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 504 (1938), (Motion to certify
record overruled, Oct. 13, 1938); 17 0. Jur., Evidence §232: ". . . the rule is
well established that admissions and declarations against interest may be
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statements must exhibit the quality of inconsistency with the facts
now asserted by the declarant in the case at bar.s3
A survey of the recent Ohio cases leaves the writer with an
impression that the court's use of the language, "admissions against
interest," may be only of vestigal significance. Some Ohio cases
have also applied the doctrine of admissions to statements against
the interest of the party when he made them, but without an in-
clusion in the ruling of the words "against interest."34 The phrase
may have been carried over from the older cases, in which the
confusion with the declarations against interest exception persist-
ed.
Further, if seems noteworthy that in none of these Ohio cases
was the question ever raised and discussed as to whether an extra-
judicial admission actually was against the declarant's interest
when made. Yet in some it would seem to be arguable.35 In Stribley
v. WeIz, 36 the plaintiff in an action for a breach of promise to marry
introduced as admissions love letters written to her by the defend-
ant. The case does not reveal the content of the letters, but it is
reasonable to assume that the defendant's statements were self-
serving when written. However, their admissibility was not ques-
tioned. In the McMahen case,.37 where the defendant in negotiating
the sale of a heating unit promised a fifty degree temperature in
the plaintiff's garage, the court held the statements competent as
admissions against interest. However, a self-serving feature seems
to be present. Often people are inclined to distrust a salesman be-
cause his statements are said to be to his interest. Dean Wigmore
indicates that in a sales situation the false statement that a specific
act had been accomplished would be to the salesman's interest.3 s
In Wade v. State,39 the defendant's earlier statements to a grand
jury were admitted against him. Although it clearly appeared to
the court that these statements were induced by a hope of immun-
ity from prosecution, the question of the interest of the declarant
33 4 WiGaoP, EvmnEc §1048 (3d ed. 1940).
34 Satchell v. Doram, 4 Ohio St. 542 (1855); Edgar v. Richardson, 33 Ohio
St. 581 (1878); Freas v. Sullivan, 130 Ohio St 486, 200 N.E. 639 (1936) where
syllabus eight reads as follows: "Admissions of alleged tort-feasor, made two
weeks after a collision relative to his individual responsibility in causing such
a collision, are competent against such tort-feasor."
3 5 Stribley v. Welz, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 571 (1894); Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v.
McMahen, note 28, supra; Wade v. State, 15 Ohio Cir. Dec. 279, 2 Ohio Cir.
Ct., N. S., 189 (1903), affd. 70 Ohio St. 463, 72 N.E. 1166 (1904); McDevitt v.
Morrow, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 281, 94 N.E2d 2 (1952).
368 Ohio Cir. Ct. 571 (1894).
3 7 See note 28, supra.
38 4 WiGoum, supra, note 33, §1048 n. 4.
39 See note 35, supra.
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in making them was not considered. In McDevitt v. Morrow,40 the
allegations in a petition to cancel a deed, that the deed had been
executed and delivered, constituted an "admission against inter-
est" to prove the delivery of the deed. Although allegations in a
pleading are usually self-serving, this evidence was admitted with-
out objection. Perhaps this question of the declarant's interest at
the time he made the statement did not concern the court because
the use of the terminology, "against interest," was solely with re-
gard to the matter of relevacy. 41
If it can be said, as the older Ohio cases indicated, that an ad-
mission of a party-opponent must be against his interest at the
time he made the statement as is required by the declarations
against interest exception to the hearsay rule,42 then it would seem
that it is solely the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest
that is involved.43 Yet it has been held in Ohio that the admissions
of a defendant are admissible against him regarding transactions
that affect only his liability to a criminal penalty.44 In State v.
Mueller,45 conversations with a defendant at his office were compe-
tent as admissions that he was illegally practicing medicine without
a license in violation of Oino REv. CODE § 4731.41. In State v.
Hirsch 46 involving a prosecution for occupying a room with an ap-
paratus for recording wagers in violation of OHIo REV. CODE:
§ 2915.09 statements of the defendant to a police officer were ad-
mitted in evidence. These cases are authority for the proposition
that the Ohio courts have abandoned the conception that the re-
quirement as to the interest of the declarant at the time he made
the statement is the same for admissions as for declarations against
interest. It could be said that these courts have taken the position
that the statements are also admissible if they are against the op-
ponent's penal interest when made. This seems unlikely, however,
in view of the fact that the English and American courts have con-
sistently imposed the requirement of pecuniary and proprietary in-
terest upon statements admissible because of their disserving fea-
tures.
47
Another line of cases has developed in Ohio in which the ques-
40 Ibid.
41 See discussion citing note 33, supra.
42 See discussion citing note 22, supra.
43 See note 16, supra, and note 60, infra.
44 State v. Mueller, 41 Ohio App. 102, 179 N.E. 503 (1931), error dismissed
124 Ohio St. 655, 181 N.E. 880 (1931); State v. Hirsch, 23 Ohio Op. 128, 8 Ohio
Supp. 128 (1948).
4 5 See note 44, supra.
46 Ibid.
47 5 WIGMORE, supra, note 1, §1476; Neighbors v. State, 121 Ohio St. 525,
169 N.E. 839 (1930); Donnely v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913). For a con-
trary holding, see Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
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tion of the true nature of admissions was directly presented. The
introduction of the admissions was claimed to be objectionable be-
cause the declarant had not been questioned in court as to the
statement. These courts distinguished between the admissions doc-
trine and the introduction of a witness's prior inconsistent state-
ments which requires the laying of a foundation. In stating the
basis for the competency of admissions, they made no reference
to any necessity that statements be against the maker's interest.
In DeGroodt v. Skrbina,48 the court quoted 2 Jox-ms, Cownu=Ams
ON EVID TcE § 236:
" 'It has always been competent to show admissions
made by the parties to the record whether the admissions
were made while testifying as a witness, or were made
upon the streets. Such statements are evidence for the ad-
verse party. If the testimony is of such a character as to
constitute an admission of the party, it is not necessary to
lay the foundation for its reception... The reason for the
admission of such statements is both clear and compelling.
They are admitted because conduct of a party to the pro-
ceeding, in respect to the matter in dispute, whether by
acts, speech, or writing, which is clearly inconsistent with
the truth of his contention, is a fact revelant to the
issue...'
Rather, this language of the court is consistent with the orthodox
explanation of the doctrine. 49
THE SITUATION IN OTHER JUmSDICTIONS
The use of the phrase, "admissions against interest," is com-
mon to several states besides Ohio. 0 However, no case has been
43See note 28, supra.
49 See discussion citing note 13, supra.5o Togni v. Slocomb, 12 Cal. App. 733, 108 Pac. 723 (1910): "This was clear-
ly admissible as an admission against interest, and as indicative of appel-
lant's understanding of what property he was purchasing"; Donoghue v.
Hayden, 38 Cal. App. 550, 208 Pac. 1007, 1008 (1922): "It was voluntarily
made and it constituted an admission against interest"; 10 Cal. Jur., Evidence
§307; La Sell v. Tri-States Theatre Corporation, 235 Iowa 492, 17 N.W.2d. 89, 94
(1945); Northrup v. Colter, 150 Mo. App. 639, 131 S.W. 364, 366 (1910); "...the
oral testimony as to plaintiff's advising Capt. Alt to accept the proposi-
tion neither tended to prove an admission against interest, nor that he
had accepted a proposition which was never made"; Grodsky v. Consoli-
dated Bag Co., 324 Mo. 1067, 26 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1930): "There is a clear dis-
tinction as to admissibility of declarations by a witness not a party to the
action... , and declarations against interest by a party to the action!,; Gen-
try v. Benge, 129 Neb. 493, 261 N.W. 854, 855 (1935): "It is a well-settled
rule that admissions of a party against interest made in court or out of
court . .. are admissible in evidence against such party"; Kellner v. Whaley,
148 Neb. 259, 27 N.W.2d 183, 189 (1947): "Any statement made by or
attributable to a party to an action which constitutes an admission against
his interest and tends to establish or disprove any material fact in the case
is competent against him"; Kiener v. Steinfeld, 137 N.JJ.L 679, 61 A.2d 305,
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found which rejected an opponent's extra-judicial statement be-
cause it was not against his interest at the time it was made.5 ' Some
of the decisions of these jurisdictions have indicated that the reason
prompting the use of words "against interest" may be other than
to require that the statement be made against the opponent's in-
terest.5 2 In the Bintz case,53 the New York court indicated that the
admission need not be made against the party's interest. Yet other
New York cases contain language similar to that of the Ohio
cases.5 4 In the Pansini case,55 the California court used language
indicating that the words, "against interest," may relate only to
the problem of relevancy mentioned earlier.5 6
"'... as shown by the cases cited by appellants on this
point, in order to bring a statement or declaration within
the operation of the rule contended for it must be shown
that the statement or declaration was signed or made by
the party against whose interest it is sought to have it
apply; and that is not the situation here presented." (Em-
phasis supplied).
In the Hoeffner case,5 7 the Missouri court stated as follows:
"... an admission against interest comprises any state-
ment of a party inconsistent with his claim in an action
and therefore amounting to proof against him.."
306 (1949): "There can be no doubt of the admissibility in evidence of ad-
missions against interest"; Reed v. McCord, 18 App. Div. 381, 46 N.Y.S. 407
(1897) affd in 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1897): "It may be assumed that,
at the time of the inquest, he acted as an employer usually would act..., and
that this admission against his interest was not without some foundation of
information"; Jackson v. Dickman, 256 App. Div. 925, 9 N.YS.2d 688 (1939)
reargument denied 256 App. Div. 1003, 11 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1939): "It is not
a prerequisite to the receipt of an admission made by a party against his
interest that such an admission be under oath"; Stanford v. Holloway, 25
Tenn. App. 379, 157 S.W.2d 864, 870 (1942): "The statement ... should not
be taken as an admission against interest"; Stewart v. Miller, - Tex.
Civ. App. -, 271 S.W. 311, 316 (1925): ". . . his subsequent acts and declara-
tions were not competent as admissions against interest"; American Nat.
Ins. Co. v. Villegas, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 32 S.W.2d 1109, 1111 (1930):
"The evidence was admissible as admissions against interest!'; 17 Tex. Jur.,
Evidence §224. This collection of cases is by no means comprehensive, but
is merely intended as an example of the situation in some other jurisdictions.
514 WiGuory, supra, note 28, §1048.
52 Bintj v. Mihd City Co., 223 App. Div. 533, 229 N.Y.S. 390 (1928); Pan-
sini v. Weber, 53 Cal. App. 2d 1, 127 P. 2d 288 (1942); Hoeffner v. Western
Leather Clothing Co., - Mo. App. - , 161 S.W.2d 722 (1942); So-
browolski v. Glowack4 136 N.J.L. 167, 54 A.2d 758 (1948); Dvorak v. Kucera,
130 Neb. 34; 264 N.W. 737 (1936).
53 See note 52, supra.
54See note 50, supra.
S5 See note 52, supra.
5 6 See discussion citing note 33, supra.
s7 See note 52, supra.
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In the Sobrowolski case58 the New Jersey court made the fol-
lowing statement:
"admissions against interest are receivable against the
party-opponent because they have the quality of inconsis-
tency with his present claim, i.e., with the facts affirmed in
the pleadings or in the testimony ......
In the Dvorak case,59 the Nebraska court indicated as follows:
"... The evidence offered was in the nature of admis-
sions, but such are ordinarily received only when against
the interest of the party making them, not as evidence in
his favor."
These definitions indicate that admission is competent as evidence
because it is against the party's interest at the time of the trial.
They do not indicate that the statement must be to the defendant's
pecuniary or proprietary disadvantage when made even though the
courts refer to the evidence as an admission "against interest."
It is improbable that the words, "against interest," used in
many of the Ohio cases, state a requirement that the admission be
against interest when made. Cases arising under the declarations
against interest exception to the hearsay rule often involve a care-
ful consideration of the question of whether the statements were
actually against the declarant's interest when made. 60 But as point-
ed out earlier, such has not been the case with the admissions
doctrine. However, the frequent use of the words is understand-
able in light of the very early Ohio cases, 61 and of the fact that
very often admissions are in fact made against the declarant's in-
terest. Further, as the words, "against interest," may be construed
to apply to the relevancy problem, they would not appear to be
used out of place even to a court that would not require admissions
to be made against the declarant's interest. The way would seem
to be open for an Ohio court when directly presented with the
question to hold that an admission need not be against the interest
of the opponent at the time he made it, thus following the weight
of American authority.
CONCLUSION
The admissions of a party-opponent seem to be competent as
evidence because the hearsay objections are not present in the case
of these extra-judicial statements. Therefore, it would not seem to
53 Ibid.
s9 Ibid.6o See note 16 supra; Bird v. Hueston, 10 Ohio St 418 (1859); In Re
Rahe's Estate, 12 Ohio Dec. 590 (1902); Second Nat. Bank of Bucyrus v. First
Nat. Bank of Columbus, 7 Ohio App. 68 (1917); Helmig v. Kramer, 48 Ohio
App. 71, 192 N.E. 388 (1934).61 See discussion citing note 22, supra.
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be required that the statements be against the pecuniary or pro-
prietary interest of the declarant when they are made. However,
some courts have stated that this is a requirement for their ad-
missibility. The Ohio cases frequently contain the language, "ad-
missions against interest." It is believed that this is not to require
that the statements be made against the opponent's interest, but
merely that the admissions be relevant by being against the op-
ponent's interest at the time of the trial.
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